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Abstract Despite multiple axes of variation in defining
wellbeing, the paper argues for the dominance of a ‘com-
ponents approach’ in current research and practice. This
approach builds on a well-established tradition within the
social sciences of attending to categories whether for their
identification, their value or their meanings and political
resonance. The paper critiques the components approach
and explores how to move beyond it towards conceptually
integrating the various categories and dimensions through a
relational and situated account of wellbeing. Drawing on
more fluid social sciences, wellbeing is framed as an effect,
dependent on the mobilisation of resources from everyday
encounters with complex assemblages of people, things
and places. Through such a framing, wellbeing can be
conceived of as stable and amenable to change, as indi-
vidual and collective and as subjective and objective.
Policy interventions then need to attend to the relational-
ities of particular social and spatial contexts.
Keywords Wellbeing  Components  Situated 
Relational  Performance  Process
1 Introduction
Most people have pondered at some point in their lives
what it is that constitutes a good and flourishing life.
Despite an illusion of simplicity, the responses to this one
question are legion. For centuries, response has galvanised
political contestation, inspired creative endeavours,
enabled the profitable commoditisation of desires and, of
course, nourished philosophical enquiry. These areas of
response, and there are many more that could be listed,
start to hint at the multiplicity of influences that can give
equally multiple meanings to what is a good and flourish-
ing life. And whilst Aristotle is often credited with first
interrogating both the question and the response, each age
has witnessed differently framed engagements. Our con-
temporary engagement in the twenty-first century is man-
ifest and expressed through the concept of wellbeing. The
word is everywhere: in exhortations for individual action
(Rath and Harter 2010), in marketing goods and services
(Kim and Cho 2012; Little 2012), in good employer criteria
(Robertson and Cooper 2011) and in a repositioning of the
goals of government and policy intervention (nef 2004;
Stiglitz et al. 2009). There is increasing momentum and
spread of a move away from equating doing well as a
government with ensuring economic security, growth and
the material prosperity of the population. This move is
premised on an argument that although economic status has
a close association with health and wellbeing, economic
performance should be seen as part of the means to human
flourishing, not the end itself (Sen 1999). The publication
at the end of September, 2009, of the high profile Report by
the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Per-
formance and Social Progress, chaired by Stiglitz et al.
(2009), effectively reconceptualised a flourishing society as
much more than economic production and explored ways
for performance measures to include indicators of wellbe-
ing, including people’s own subjective and personal
assessments. Similar initiatives are to be found in Canada
and most recently in the United Kingdom where, in 2011,
the British government commissioned the Office for
National Statistics to consult and develop measurements of
subjective wellbeing as part of assessing social progress
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(Self et al. 2012). However, wellbeing is a notoriously
abstract and unstable term. The move towards wellbeing in
policy includes recognition that wellbeing is a complex and
multidimensional concept, but as a complex and multidi-
mensional concept, there are various alternative ways of
defining, interpreting and mobilising wellbeing for policy
purposes. It is incumbent upon academia to reflect not only
on the abstract philosophical aspects to wellbeing, but also
to reflect on which meanings are actually favoured in
practice, particularly by government and policy commu-
nities, to unpick the assumptions that underpin current
mobilisations and thereby to foster a critical engagement
with the current enthusiasm for wellbeing.
The paper will first lay out an argument that, despite
much talk over the lack of conceptual clarity in the term
wellbeing, a dominant usage is evident which has several
characteristics that frame, direct and constrain the actions
and interventions under consideration as options for
enhancing wellbeing. The second section will then engage
critically with this dominant usage to draw out the ways
this both fits and frames an individualised responsibility for
our own wellbeing. Finally, the paper proposes an alter-
native framing in which wellbeing is always and neces-
sarily situated and relational, an effect of mutually
constitutive interactions amongst the material, organic and
emotional dynamics of places. Shifting the focus from
individual acquisition and foregrounding relationality and
place offers new ways to understand wellbeing, move
beyond the categories and boundaries of contemporary
neoliberal policy and explore alternative modes of action
and intervention in advancing human flourishing.
2 A Dominant Framing of Wellbeing
Policy-facing research on wellbeing can been seen as most
often embedded within an unchallenged line of argument
that follows its logic through three points (see for example,
Allin 2007; McGillivray and Clarke 2006; Diener et al.
2009). First, there is a lack of agreement on terminology,
definitions and monitoring tools; secondly, this is important
because different understandings and definitions of well-
being risk creating barriers to communication across dif-
ferent sectors involved in policy-making; thirdly, in order
to evaluate the benefits of different policy interventions in
terms of enhancing wellbeing, there is a need for stand-
ardised indicators and monitoring tools. The case for
greater attention to wellbeing has emerged through move-
ments related to various political concerns including those
addressing broad development goals, environmentally
sustainable living, and a focus on an individualized, psy-
chological state of happiness or flourishing. Whilst the
concept of wellbeing unifies these different calls for policy
to look beyond economic measures of social progress, the
different engagements can be distinguished across various
dimensions including those of scale, scope, location and
responsibility. Several discourses of wellbeing are docu-
mented as co-existing within current policy debates, and,
moreover, the specifics of how wellbeing is defined
through particular aspects and how these may be weighted
in different approaches show great variation (Ereaut and
Whiting 2008; Atkinson and Joyce 2011). However, this
evident variation notwithstanding, there is also a consid-
erable degree of convergence in the underlying contem-
porary approach to wellbeing that informs both policy
documents and policy-facing research.
Research and policy mostly deal with the abstract nature
of wellbeing by breaking it down into constitutive dimen-
sions in what has been called ‘a components approach to
wellbeing’ (Atkinson and Joyce 2011; Atkinson et al. 2012).
In this approach, debate centres on the identification and
theorisation of the independent elements that comprise
wellbeing. Some schemas, often associated with assessing
social progress of collective units, identify a mix of objec-
tive and subjective elements (for example, Clarke 2006;
Nussbaum 2000; Stiglitz et al. 2009). Other schemas elab-
orate the components of personal subjective wellbeing,
typically differentiated by hedonic (for example, Layard
2005; Seligman 2011) and eudaimonic variants (for exam-
ple, Ryff 1989; Ryff et al. 2004; Veenhoven 2000; see also
Deci and Ryan 2008; Ryan and Deci 2001). Component lists
have also been derived from empirical research on people’s
own definitions of what is important to their wellbeing; the
United Kingdom’s Office for National Statistics (Self et al.
2012) shaped a national consultation on wellbeing through a
set of domains derived from preliminary public engagement
(relationships, health, activities of work/leisure and balance,
where we live, personal finance, education and skills, con-
textual domains of governance, economy and natural envi-
ronment). Depending on the entry point into exploring
wellbeing, the factors that commonly appear in this kind of
debate may be cast as either components or determinants of
wellbeing. So in research on personal subjective wellbeing,
the economic and a range of other social elements are cast as
determinants, as in the influential Easterlin paradox (Eas-
terlin 1974, 1995; Layard 2005; for a critique see Albor
2009; Stevenson and Wolfers 2008). For those attempting to
define the entirety of human flourishing, independent
dimensions to wellbeing cover a wide range of factors which
both interact and respond to other external and collective
determinants (Stiglitz et al. 2009).
A second feature of contemporary approaches to well-
being is that they all share a common understanding of
wellbeing as a quality that inheres to the individual.
Wellbeing may be influenced by factors and processes
from the individual to the global in scale and reach; it may
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be an objective characteristic or a subjective assessment; it
may refer to a current state or a projection into the future,
but the concept of well-being itself is individual in scale.
Others have documented the emergence of the term well-
being as predominantly individualised (Sointu 2005) and
others have also pointed out that despite the individuali-
sation of wellbeing, there are still alternative discourses
mobilised that treat the concept as more collective, most
prominently in relation to sustainability and environment
(Ereaut and Whiting 2008; Atkinson and Joyce 2011).
However, the argument here goes slightly further to claim
that this individualisation of wellbeing also constitutes
wellbeing as some kind of commodity, an entity that can be
acquired, or at least achieved. And this is important in
terms of policy as it drives intervention in terms of what
can be done to enhance individual-directed acquisition of
the components of wellbeing. A third feature of contem-
porary engagements with wellbeing is that one discourse of
wellbeing has become dominant in research and in policy
over others, that is, a discourse in which wellbeing is used
as a synonym for health (Ereaut and Whiting 2008). For
example, research through document analysis and inter-
views on the understanding of wellbeing within the 5 year
strategies of local government authorities in the United
Kingdom disclosed a striking tendency to conflate well-
being with health (Atkinson and Joyce 2011). Moreover,
this conflation goes even further in that not only is well-
being reduced to health, but particularly to subjective or
psychological health variously expressed through mental
health, resilience or happiness (Layard 2005; Riva and
Curtis 2012; Seligman 2011).
3 Wellbeing, Outcome and Process
Conceptualising wellbeing as a set of entities that can be
individually acquired does have value for both research and
policy. A definition based on individually acquired entities
allows us to ascribe stability to personal wellbeing, at least
in the medium-term, and ascribing stability in turn enables
the measurement of wellbeing through which to identify
trends and associations and to evaluate interventions.
Change in the acquisition of the components of personal
wellbeing can be evaluated through the standard approach
of a before and after assessment design. Building on a
components approach, research and policy documents
mostly position wellbeing as the desired outcome, assess-
ing the relative influences of different determinants and
trying to identify successful policy interventions to
enhance that outcome. However, wellbeing can also be
positioned as part of a process towards other desirable
goals or criteria of success. The implications of thinking
about wellbeing not only as a possibly desirable endpoint
but also as a significant process factor can take at least
three directions.
Thinking of wellbeing as process may challenge the
contemporary dominant approach to wellbeing, specifically
making a case against calls for a tighter definition of the
concept. A study of how wellbeing was mobilised, under-
stood and positioned within local government policy in the
United Kingdom concluded that there are advantages to an
ill-defined, somewhat abstract understanding of wellbeing.
Rather than feeling frustrated at the lack of consensus on
the definition of wellbeing, local government officials
found that the various discourses of wellbeing in circula-
tion provoked valuable reflection and discussion on the
goals of local government action. The ill-defined nature of
wellbeing also provided a concept through which highly
divergent perspectives on important goals for local gov-
ernment could emerge in consultation with local partner
community-based organisations (Atkinson and Joyce
2011). A relatively open understanding of wellbeing even
brings advantages for the health sector. Although an
understanding of wellbeing as synonymous with health
might seem advantageous for medical expertise and med-
ical concerns to take a central role in shaping and evalu-
ating policy, in practice containing and controlling the
concept within a health domain would undermine the
opportunity offered by a broad understanding of wellbeing
to build the intersectoral partnerships that are vital to
advance a model of health that addresses a wide range of
influences on differential health experiences (Atkinson
2011). Theoretical analyses of policy processes generally
have similarly observed the value of key policy concepts
that retain an ill-defined quality in enabling rhetoric, debate
and flexibility in practice (Hajer 1995, 2005; Hajer and
Versteeg 2005). Thus, wellbeing, exactly because of its
vague and all-embracing character, offers a conceptual
unifier across different sectors through acting as part of the
process of policy-making as much as an outcome of policy-
making. From this perspective, establishing a tight and
measurable definition of wellbeing in order to evaluate
outcomes would seriously limit the scope of policy work
that the concept has the potential to achieve.
Thinking of wellbeing as process also exposes a sepa-
ration of subjective wellbeing from more objective material
aspects and health status as nonsensical, perhaps even
dangerously illusionary. An argument that has attracted
much attention in recent years is that inequalities in health
relate strongly to relative inequalities in the distribution of
material and developmental resources (Wilkinson and
Pickett 2009). This association is strongly suggestive of a
mediating role for a experiential happiness with one’s
circumstances that is first and foremost situated in com-
parison with the norms of one’s social settings and that
then impacts on other outcomes, particularly in this case
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health status. In this, it is difficult to distinguish which of
happiness, health and wealth is the process and which the
outcome. There is also a popular distrust of apparently
uncritical happiness, a suspicion that enduring happiness
may be founded on various cognitive and affective states
that are considered deficient. In the context of Wilkinson’s
relative inequalities thesis, for those with advantages, the
‘haves’, contentment and happiness may be based on
naivety or ignorance about global and local relations of
inequality and perhaps worse, complacency and a lack of
care for the circumstances of others. For the ‘have-nots’,
contentment and happiness may be based on a lack of
aspiration and an acceptance of social injustices. Again,
happiness is not only the outcome in these scenarios.
In both cases, happiness and contentment not only reflect
but also feed a lack of critical reflection on society’s
values or a lack of imagination with respect to alternative
possibilities.
In contrast, thinking of wellbeing as process may also
respond to calls to fix the concept of wellbeing and narrow
attention onto a personalised subjective understanding of
wellbeing. Increasingly, both in research and in popular
imagination, wellbeing is equated at an individual scale
with various terms of positive affect. Happiness has tended
to be the term to capture this partly perhaps because of its
populist currency and partly because it can be slotted into
an economist way of thinking as to what it is that people
want to maximise in their lives, what drives their decision-
making choices and how this can be enhanced through
policy (Layard 2005). However, whereas an economic
approach to wellbeing as happiness treats positive affect as
the endpoint, the driver of other choices and the desired
outcome of social policy, psychological approaches to
wellbeing as happiness enable wellbeing to be attended to
as both outcome and determinant of other outcomes. There
is a rapidly growing body of research exploring the
determinants of subjective wellbeing, happiness or other
variants of positive affect, across a wide range of factors,
but there is an equally rapidly growing literature treating
subjective wellbeing or happiness as primarily under per-
sonal and internal control. In this work, wellbeing becomes
no longer primarily an outcome of external factors, but a
process of internal management and the object of personal
responsibility. Moreover, this emphasis on personal action
effectively positions many of the components typically
comprising psychological definitions of subjective well-
being as influences on various other personal outcomes and
socially recognised criteria of success. These include many
health conditions and health-related behaviours (Huber
et al. 2011; Salovey et al. 2000), employment and earning
capacity (de Neve and Oswald 2012), productivity at work
(Robertson and Cooper 2010) and so on. The promise of
the power of working on one’s own internal wellbeing,
happiness or positive affect is reflected in an explosion of
books grounded in the positive psychology movement that
provide instruction on improving happiness in one’s life.
The titles of publications disclose the emergence of this
projection of subjective wellbeing as a self-directed
approach. Indicative titles include the early texts from the
founders of the positive psychology movement that pro-
mote procedures to acquire wellbeing, ‘Learned optimism:
how to change your mind’ (Seligman 1990) and ‘Flow: The
psychology of optimal experience’ with a recent new cover
describing it as ‘the classic work on how to achieve hap-
piness’ (Csikszentmihalyi 1991/2002). More recent exam-
ples indicate an explicitly skill-oriented uptake of the
message, such as ‘Happiness: a guide to developing life’s
most important skill’ (Ricard 2003) and explicit reference
to the benefits of positive affect for other areas of success
in life, such as ‘Positivity. Groundbreaking research to
release your inner optimist and thrive’ (Fredrickson 2009)
or ‘The happiness advantage. The seven principles of
positive psychology that fuel success and performance at
work’ (Achor 2010).
Whilst there is undoubtedly evidence to support asso-
ciations between positive psychology and other measures
of success or resilience to adversity, an exclusive focus on
wellbeing as internal and amenable to self-management
logically leads to policy responses that similarly focus
primarily on individual deficits in fostering and sustaining
positive wellbeing. For example, cognitive behavioural
therapy has gained a rapid momentum of uptake across a
range of conditions and social contexts (see for example,
Lloyd et al. 2012; Lynch et al. 2010; Mongia and Hecht-
man 2012). This approach, then, is becoming ever more
dominant in wellbeing and happiness literature, but perhaps
is best known through Seligman’s work on positive psy-
chology, authentic happiness (2002) and more recently
flourishing (2011). While wellbeing economists, such as
Layard (2005), argue for a driving purpose to our choices
and goals that can be captured through a notion of happi-
ness, Seligman increasingly gives attention to what we
ourselves can do to enhance our own wellbeing or flour-
ishing. Seligman’s most recent elaboration posits five
components, or ‘pillars’, of wellbeing captured by the
acronym ‘PERMA’: positive emotion; engagement and
interest (curiosity about the world); relationships; meaning;
accomplishment (2011). The claim is that if we can achieve
these qualities and if we can feed these qualities then we
will feel better about how our lives are going, and indeed
Seligman provides many positive experiences of such
improvement.
There is an emergent literature beginning to counter
some of the claims made for the power of subjective
wellbeing, such as claims for beneficial effects on the
outcomes of serious illness such as cancer (Coyne and
140 S. Atkinson
123
Tennen 2010; Ehrenreich 2009). Research grounded in
critical social and cultural theory also offer a challenge to
this internalised and universalised presentation of wellbe-
ing. The main critique levelled at this approach to wellbeing
is that achieving these qualities is presented as largely an
individual and internalised task of self-management, and
that consequently failure of wellbeing can be positioned as
failure of responsible citizenship. An individualised
responsibility for such self-actualisation has been posi-
tioned as a significant feature of western society within a
Foucauldian inspired analysis of contemporary forms of
governance (Foucault 1991; Miller and Rose 2008). An
analysis of the roots and development of the concept of
wellbeing into its current usage details how in the 1960s and
1970s, wellbeing was understood as a collective concept,
most commonly used in the context of the economy (Sointu
2005) or the moral attitudes to social and environmental
inequalities (Smith 2000). Sointu (2005) explicitly locates
the observable change in the dominant understanding and
usage of the term wellbeing within the Foucauldian analysis
of changes taking place over the same time period in
dominant political ideology, and most particular those
changes associated with the emergence of contemporary
forms of neoliberalism. Seen through this lens, the question
presents itself, both in relation to wellbeing as happiness
and wellbeing as resilience, as to whether these are in fact
outcomes or are rather the processes through which our
conduct is directed according to the requirements of the
political or economic imperatives of others.
The cultural theorist, Ahmed, elaborates this question
further and profoundly problematises the very notion of
happiness within contemporary western society, arguing
that happiness is a highly politically charged concept. The
avowed sources of happiness are pre-defined for us: for
example, love, marriage and children; wealth, success and
social standing; health, fitness and particular style. These
constitute packages offered as promised routes to the good
life and, as such, direct us towards making specific life
choices which have considerable political content in
reproducing social norms, consumption norms and various
forms of discrimination (Ahmed 2010). This critique
exposes a circularity in the argument of the positive psy-
chology movement for individually targeted support for
self-actualisation in that both the acquisition of personal
subjective wellbeing and the acquisition of the associated
elements of a good life are all normative values to which
we are directed by our social situation, rather than any
internal, decontextualized and ‘authentic’ notion of hap-
piness. The acquisition of subjective wellbeing is then itself
part of the definition of a successful and modern social self.
Given the message that achieving success in all areas of life
is apparently only limited by our own positive attitudes and
choices, part of presenting oneself as a successful and
modern social being necessarily involves enacting or per-
forming an appearance of subjective wellbeing that may be at
odds with any real state of positive affect. As such, wellbeing
is clearly process rather than the outcome, a process through
which to successfully perform self and negotiate inter-sub-
jectivity. In an account of the emergence and imperative to
demonstrate successful wellbeing in the context of the Uni-
ted States, Ehrenreich (2009) documents and critiques the
currency of assertions that positivity has dominion over a
range of material aspects of life, including wealth and
physical health. An argument that the acquisition of those
qualities defined as constituting a successful life is largely
determined by internal attitudes is an argument for what
many consider the illusion of a meritocratic society in which
inequality can be dismissed through blaming the victims.
Understanding that wellbeing may increasingly be perfor-
mance rather than experience raises questions for how
measuring wellbeing as an outcome informs policy purposes
and what it can really tell us. Expressions of wellbeing are
likely to be highly mediated in ways that vary in different
specific social and spatial contexts.
4 Wellbeing, Situated and Relational
The role of context in relation to affect is largely neglected
within positive psychology, but is given very different
treatment within cultural studies that examine the ‘‘affec-
tive colourings of socio-spatial life’’ (Anderson 2004: 740).
To date this treatment has been little reflected within
mainstream work on wellbeing or happiness. While there is
a multiplicity of definitions and approaches to under-
standing affect, all share a decentring of the individual such
that, ‘‘…there is no such thing as a pre-existing human
subject who then encounters human or non-human others
and emotes… All subjects are constantly constituted per-
formatively, in encounters with other things.’’ (Rose et al.
2010: 345). Moreover, the very distinctions of subject and
world, the inside and outside are themselves constituted
through the circulation of affects (Anderson 2006). How-
ever, this emphasis on transpersonal capacity and the cir-
culation and distribution of affects also requires attention to
the unevenness in the flows of affects, of how they may
cohere as a generative force, endure or dissipate, that is the
need to attend to geopolitical landscapes, to power geom-
etries, to historicity and, ‘‘the political fact of different
bodies having different affective capacities.’’ (Tolia-Kelly
2006: 213). Exploring the unevenness in the circulation of
affect has been taken up by Ahmed (2004a, b) who asks
why and how affects ‘stick’ to certain signs rather than
others. Ahmed provides an explicitly historicised account
of affect; the temporality of affects is foregrounded as
important not because of their fleeting quality as in other
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literatures, but because some affects are likely to become
fixed to some signs, bodies or objects for different dura-
tions, and thus inform an affective politics. Ahmed’s par-
ticular attention to collective affects offers a very different
lens through which to think about wellbeing. Here, the very
boundaries of bodies, subjects and organisational structures
are contoured by affective clusterings or settlements and
constitute temporary fixing of nodal points. The distinction
is dissolved between approaches in which the external
world primarily affects the emotional responses and
approaches in which the affective state of the subject pri-
marily determines and interprets the external stimuli.
Instead, ‘‘emotions work to create the very distinction
between the inside and the outside, and that this separation
takes place through the very movement engendered by
responding to other and objects’’ (2004a: 28).
The cultural studies approach to affect and wellbeing
offers an intriguing potential for working through the
connections or blurring the distinctions between internal
and external determinants of wellbeing, objective and
subjective aspects of wellbeing and individual and collec-
tive levels of wellbeing. By focussing on the movement
and clusterings of affect, wellbeing becomes a quality of
situatedness and of relationality. However, many social
theorists are not ready to let go fully of a notion of the
centrality of individuals in social analysis, nor of wellbeing
as inseparably interwoven with understandings of identity.
Whether wellbeing is best conceptualised as outcome, as
process or as a flow of affects is likely to depend on the
focus of interest. Obviously much of the time it is useful to
position some variant of wellbeing as the desired outcome
of various interventions. The mainstream components
approach in which wellbeing is constituted through a set of
entities that can be individually acquired or achieved has
value in that this ascribes stability to personal wellbeing
which enables measurement, at least in the short- to med-
ium-term and the evaluation of change. However, under-
standing change, and the processes through which
intervention may engender change, requires an under-
standing of wellbeing as simultaneously unstable or able to
be destabilised. Wellbeing thus needs to be understood not
as sets of entities to be acquired as internalised qualities of
individuals but instead as a set of effects produced in
specific times and places (Kesby 2007).
Building on an understanding of wellbeing a both situ-
ated and relational informs the ‘spaces of wellbeing’
approach which offers a framing of how different social
and spatial contexts may be facilitative (Fleuret and
Atkinson 2007; Hall 2010). The framing allows wellbeing
to be emergent through situated and relational effects that
are dependent on the mobilisation of resources within
different social and spatial contexts, thus bridging the
typical divisions between individual and collective and
subjective and objective. The approach proposes four
interrelated spaces of resource mobilisation: capabilities
(Nussbaum 2000), social integration (Putnam 2001; Wil-
kinson and Marmot 2003), security (Shaw 2004) and
therapeutic processes (Conradson 2005; Smyth 2005).
Wellbeing, as a set of situated and relational effects renders
the embodied sense of self as deeply embedded within
wider systems of recognition and misrecognition (Block
and Kissell 2001; Fisher 2008; Prilleltensky 2005). Instead
of social relations as something to acquire, a network of
connections, the focus here is on the relationality itself.
Moreover, wellbeing here comprises complex assemblages
of relations not only between people, but also between
people and places, material objects and less material con-
stituents of places including atmosphere, histories and
values (Panelli and Tipa 2009). Wellbeing is thus con-
ceptualised as in constant production and reproduction.
However, the habituated routines of everyday life, our sit-
uated repertoires of practice (Gutie´rrez and Rogoff 2003),
tend to reproduce, rather than destabilise, our embodied and
embedded selves, which allows wellbeing to become stable
and meaningful to measure over the medium-term. At the
same time, this approach to wellbeing also offers a means to
understanding how wellbeing can change both for better
and worse and how interventions may facilitate destabili-
sations of habituated practices that open new relational
assemblages. Framing wellbeing as relational and situated
makes explicit that wellbeing can have no form, expression
or enhancement without attention to the spatial dynamics of
such effects. This alternative framing of wellbeing has
associated alternative implications for how policy for
wellbeing constitutes the primary focus of its interventions.
A shift is demanded away from how to enhance the
resources for wellbeing centred on individual acquisition
and towards attending to the social, material and spatially
situated relationships through which individual and col-
lective wellbeing are effected. As Haidt proposes, ‘Happi-
ness comes from the between’ (2006: 213).
Acknowledgments The research underpinning the paper is sup-
ported through a Welcome Trust Strategic Award at Durham Uni-
versity (Grant WT086049: Medicine and human flourishing).
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author(s) and the source are credited.
References
Achor S (2010) The happiness advantage. The seven principles of
positive psychology that fuel success and performance at work.
Random House, New York
142 S. Atkinson
123
Ahmed S (2004a) Collective feelings: OR, the impression left by
others. Theory Culture Soc 21:25–42
Ahmed S (2004b) Affective economies. Soc Text 79:117–139
Ahmed S (2010) The promise of happiness. Duke University Press,
Durham
Albor C (2009) How much can money buy happiness? Is the debate
over for the Easterlin Paradox? Radic Stat 98:38–49. http://www.
radstats.org.uk/no098/Albor98.pdf
Allin P (2007) Measuring societal wellbeing. Econ Lab Market Rev
1:46–65
Anderson B (2004) Time-stilled space-slowed: how boredom matters.
Geoforum 35:739–754
Anderson B (2006) Becoming and being hopeful: towards a theory of
affect. Environ Plan D 24:733–752
Atkinson S (2011) Care is needed in moves to measure wellbeing.
BMJ 343:1051
Atkinson S, Joyce KE (2011) The place and practices of wellbeing in
local governance. Environ Plan C 29:133–148
Atkinson S, Fuller S, Painter J (2012) Wellbeing and place. In:
Atkinson S, Fuller S, Painter J (eds) Wellbeing and place.
Ashgate, Farnham
Block B, Kissell JL (2001) The dance: essence of embodiment. Theor
Med 22:5–15
Clarke M (2006) Assessing well-being using hierarchical needs. In:
McGillivray M, Clark M (eds) Understanding human well-being.
United Nations University, Tokyo
Conradson D (2005) Landscape, care and the relational self:
therapeutic encounters in rural England. Health Place 11:
337–348
Coyne JC, Tennen H (2010) Positive psychology in cancer care: bad
science, exaggerated claims, and unproven medicine. Ann Behav
Med 39:16–36
Csikszentmihalyi M (1991) Flow: the psychology of optimal expe-
rience. HarperPerennial, New York (2002 edition, Random
House, Sydney)
De Neve J-E, Oswald AJ (2012) Estimating the influence of life
satisfaction and positive affect on later income using sibling
fixed effects. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 109:19953–19958
Deci EL, Ryan RM (2008) Hedonia, Eudaimonia and well-being: an
introduction. J Happiness Stud 9:1–11
Diener E, Lucas R, Schimmack U, Helliwell J (2009) Well-being for
public policy. Oxford University Press, New York
Easterlin RA (1974) Does economic growth improve the human lot?
Some empirical evidence. In: David PA, Reder MW (eds)
Nations and households in economic growth: essays in honor of
Moses Abramovitz. Academic Press, New York
Easterlin RA (1995) Will raising the incomes of all increase the
happiness of all? J Econ Behav Organ 27:35–47
Ehrenreich B (2009) Smile or die. How positive thinking fooled
America and the World. Granta, London
Ereaut G, Whiting R (2008) What do we mean by ‘wellbeing’? And
why might it matter? Linguistic Landscapes Research Report no.
DCSF-RW073 for the Department for Children, Schools and
Families
Fisher P (2008) Wellbeing and empowerment: the importance of
recognition. Sociol Health Illn 4:583–598
Fleuret S, Atkinson S (2007) Wellbeing, health and geography: a
critical review and research agenda. NZ Geographer 63:106–118
Foucault M (1991) Governmentality. In: Burchell G, Gordon C,
Miller P (eds) The foucault effect: studies in governmentality.
Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hertfordshire
Fredrickson B (2009) Positivity, groundbreaking research to release
your inner optimist and thrive. Three Rivers Press, Random
House, New York
Gutie´rrez KD, Rogoff B (2003) Cultural ways of learning: individual
traits or repertoires of practice. Educ Res 32:19–25
Haidt J (2006) The happiness hypothesis: putting ancient wisdom to
the test of modern science. Heinemann, Random House, London
Hajer MA (1995) The politics of environmental discourse: ecological
modernization and the policy process. Oxford University Press,
New York
Hajer MA (2005) Rebuilding ground zero. The politics of perfor-
mance. Plan Theory Pract 6:445–464
Hajer M, Versteeg W (2005) A decade of discourse analysis of
environmental politics: achievements, challenges, perspectives.
J Environ Plan Policy Manag 7:175–184
Hall E (2010) Spaces of wellbeing for people with learning
disabilities. Scott Geogr J 126:275–284
Huber M, Knottnerus JA, Green J, van der Horst H, Jadad AR,
Kromhout D, Leonard B, Lorig K, Loureiro MI, van der Meer
JWM, Schabel P, Smith R, van Weel C, Smid H (2011) How
should we define health? BMJ 343:d4163 doi:10.1136/bmj.d4163
Kesby M (2007) Spatialising participatory approaches: the contribu-
tion of geography to a mature debate. Environ Plan A 29:
2813–2831
Kim K, Cho YC (2012) A content analysis of advertising transitions:
impact of brand name, persona and appeal. J Bus Econ Res
10:501–511
Layard R (2005) Happiness: lessons from a new science. Penguin
(Allen Lane), London
Little J (2012) Pampering, well-being and women’s bodies in the
therapeutic spaces of the spa. Soc Cultural Geogr 14:41–58
Lloyd S, Chalder T, Rimes KA (2012) Family-focused cognitive
behaviour therapy versus psycho-education for adolescents with
chronic fatigue syndrome: long-term follow-up of an RCT.
Behav Res Ther 50:719–725
Lynch D, Laws KR, McKenna PJ (2010) Cognitive behavioural
therapy for major psychiatric disorder: does it really work? A
meta-analytical review of well-controlled trials. Psychol Med
40:9–24
McGillivray M, Clarke M (eds) (2006) Understanding human well.
United Nations University Press, Tokyo
Miller P, Rose N (2008) Governing the present. Polity Press,
Cambridge
Mongia M, Hechtman L (2012) Cognitive behavior therapy for adults
with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder: a review of recent
randomized controlled trials. Curr Psychiatry Rep 14:561–567
Nussbaum MC (2000) Women and human development—the capa-
bilities approach. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Panelli R, Tipa G (2009) Beyond foodscapes: considering geogra-
phies of indigenous well-being. Health Place 15:455–465
Prilleltensky I (2005) Promoting well-being: time for a paradigm shift
in health and human services. Scand J Public Health 33(suppl
66):53–60
Putnam R (2001) Bowling alone. Simon & Schuster, New York
Rath T, Harter JK (2010) Wellbeing: the five essential elements.
Gallup Press, New York
Ricard M (2003) Happiness. A guide to developing life’s most
important skill. Little, Brown and Company, New York
Riva M, Curtis S (2012) The significance of material and social contexts
for health and wellbeing in rural England. In: Atkinson S, Fuller S,
Painter J (eds) Wellbeing and place. Ashgate, Farnham
Robertson I, Cooper C (2011) Well-being: productivity and happiness
at work. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke
Rose G, Degen M, Dasdas B (2010) More on ‘big things’: building
events and feelings. Trans Instit Br Geogr 35:334–349
Ryan RM, Deci EL (2001) On happiness and human potentials: a
review of research on hedonic and eudaimonic well-being. Annu
Rev Psychol 52:141–166
Ryff CD (1989) Happiness is everything, or is it? Explorations on the
meaning of psychological wellbeing. J Pers Soc Psychol 57:
1069–1081
Beyond Components of Wellbeing 143
123
Ryff CD, Singer BH, Love GD (2004) Positive health: connecting
well-being with biology. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B 359:
1383–1394
Salovey P, Rothman AJ, Detweiler JB, Steward WT (2000)
Emotional states and physical health. Am Psychol 55:110–121
Self A, Thomas J, Randall C (2012) Measuring national well-being:
life in the UK, 2012. Office for National Statistics, London
Seligman MEP (1990) Learned optimism. How to change your mind.
Pocket Books, Simon & Schuster, New York
Seligman M (2002) Authentic happiness. Free Press, New York
Seligman M (2011) Flourish: a visionary new understanding of
happiness and wellbeing—and how to achieve them. Free Press,
New York
Sen A (1999) Development as freedom. Oxford University Press,
Oxford
Shaw M (2004) Housing and public health. Annu Rev Public Health
25:397–418
Smith DM (2000) Moral geographies: ethics in a world of difference.
Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh
Smyth F (2005) Medical geography: therapeutic places, spaces and
networks. Prog Hum Geogr 29:488–495
Sointu E (2005) The rise of an ideal: tracing changing discourses of
wellbeing. Sociol Rev 53:255–274
Stevenson B, Wolfers J (2008) Economic growth and subjective well-
being: reassessing the Easterlin paradox. National Bureau for
Economic Research Working Paper No. 14282. NBER, Massa-
chussetts. http://www.nber.org/papers/w14282
Stiglitz J, Sen A, Fitoussi J-P (2009) Report by the commission on the
measurement of economic performance and social progress.
www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr
Tolia-Kelly DP (2006) Affect—an ethnocentric encounter? Exploring
the ‘universalist’ imperative of emotional/affectual geographies.
Area 38:213–217
Veenhoven R (2000) The four qualities of life. J Happiness Stud
1:1–39
Wilkinson R, Marmot M (eds) (2003) Social determinants of health:
the solid facts. WHO, Geneva
Wilkinson R, Pickett K (2009) The spirit level. Penguin, London
144 S. Atkinson
123
